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Executive Summary
The advent of file sharing has considerably weakened effective copyright pro-
tection. Today, more than 60% of Internet traffic consists of consumers sharing
music, movies, books, and games. Yet, despite the popularity of the new tech-
nology, file sharing has not undermined the incentives of authors to produce
new works. We argue that the effect of file sharing has been muted for three
reasons. (1) The cannibalization of sales that is due to file sharing is more mod-
est than many observers assume. Empirical work suggests that in music, no
more than 20% of the recent decline in sales is due to sharing. (2) File sharing
increases the demand for complements to protected works, raising, for instance,
the demand for concerts and concert prices. The sale of more expensive com-
plements has added to artists’ incomes. (3) In many creative industries, mone-
tary incentives play a reduced role in motivating authors to remain creative.
Data on the supply of new works are consistent with the argument that file
sharing did not discourage authors and publishers. Since the advent of file shar-
ing, the production of music, books, and movies has increased sharply.
I. Introduction
The advent of file‐sharing technology has allowed consumers to copy
music, books, video games, and other protected works on an unprece-
dented scale at minimal cost. In this essay, we ask whether the new
technology has undermined the incentives of authors and entertain-
ment companies to create, market, and distribute new works. While
the empirical evidence of the effect of file sharing on sales is mixed,
many studies conclude that music piracy can perhaps explain as much
as one‐fifth of the recent decline in industry sales. A displacement of
sales alone, however, is not sufficient to conclude that authors have
weaker incentives to create new works. File sharing also influences the
markets for concerts, electronics, and communications infrastructure.
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tour more often and, ultimately, raising their overall income.
Data on the supply of new works are consistent with our argument
that file sharing did not discourage authors and publishers.
1 The pub-
lication of new books rose by 66% over 2002–7. Since 2000, the annual
release of new music albums has more than doubled, and worldwide
feature film production is up by more than 30% since 2003. At the same
time, empirical research in file sharing documents that consumer
welfare increased substantially due to the new technology.
Over the past 200 years, most countries evolved their copyright re-
gimes in one direction only: lawmakers repeatedly strengthened the le-
gal protections of authors and publishers, raising prices for the general
public and discouraging consumption.
2 Seen against this backdrop, file
sharing is a unique experiment that considerably weakened copyright
protections. While file sharing disrupted some traditional business
m o d e l si nt h ec r e a t i v ei n d u s t r i e s ,f o r e m o s ti nm u s i c ,i no u rr e a d i n g
of the evidence there is little to suggest that the new technology has
discouraged artistic production. Weaker copyright protection, it seems,
has benefited society.
In this essay, we discuss the currently available research that sheds
light on the effects of file sharing, particularly in music, for which its
effects have been most pronounced. We start by describing the new tech-
nology and how consumers are using it. Section IVreviews the evidence
that file sharing reduces the profitability of creating and selling new
works. We discuss the importance of complements to original works in
Section Vand describe the artistic and corporate response to file sharing
in Section VI. The concluding section offers policy implications.
II. File Sharing and Copyright
In setting copyright terms, lawmakers trade off the increased incentives
to create protected works and the higher prices that consumers face
when books, movies, and recordings must not be copied freely (Landes
and Posner 1989). As this description suggests, the lawmakers’ task is
a challenging one. Setting copyright terms in a manner that benefits
society requires an answer to two questions. First, we need to know
how much weaker the incentives to create new works would be in a
regime with more constrained copyright. Second, and equally impor-
tant, is the question of how producers would respond to weaker incen-
tives. Would they offer fewer works or perhaps works of lesser quality?
In this essay, we discuss what we know about these questions, using
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erably weakened copyright protection for music, movies, books, and
video games.
Weaker copyright is unambiguously desirable if it does not lessen the
incentives of artists and entertainment companies to produce new
works. To appreciate the impact of file sharing, we first need to know
whether the technology did in fact reduce the profitability of creating,
marketing, and distributing new works. Of course, we know that mil-
lions of consumers share billions of files without compensating artists
or entertainment companies. But the fact that file sharing is popular
tells us little about the impact of the technology on industry profits.
At a price close to zero, many consumers will download music and
movies that they would not have bought at current prices. This issue
is likely to be important. In a sample of 5,600 consumers who were will-
ing to share their iPod listening statistics, the average player held a col-
lection of over 3,500 songs (Lamere 2006). A full 64% of these songs had
never been played, making it unlikely that these consumers would
have paid much for a good portion of the music they owned. While
it is difficult to say how representative this sample is, there is no doubt
that trade groups such as the Business Software Alliance vastly exagger-
ate the impact of file sharing on industry profitability when they treat
every pirated copy as a lost sale (Economist 2005). The demand for titles
is not completely price inelastic.
Weaker property rights can undermine industry profitability if con-
sumers who would have purchased a recording obtain a free copy
instead. The critical question, then, is whether consumers perceive pro-
tected and freely shared works as close substitutes. As the name sug-
gests, substitutes are products that meet similar consumer demands.
For two substitute goods, a price decline for one leads to a decline in
the demand for the other.
3 For example, if we allowed mash‐up artists
to freely copy parts of an original song, consumers who regard the de-
rivative work as a close substitute would be less likely to buy the orig-
inal.
4 However, if consumers learned to better appreciate the original
through the mash‐up, demand for the original work might actually in-
crease. In this case, the two versions of the song are complements, two
goods for which a decrease in the price of one leads to an increase in the
demand for the other. A well‐known example for two complements is
music and iPods. As file sharing eroded the effective price of music for
a large group of consumers, demand for MP3 players soared, allowing
Apple to benefit from consumers’ increased willingness to pay for its
line of products.
5
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products and technologies are complements or substitutes. As a result,
we cannot often be sure how changes in copyright will influence de-
mand and industry profitability. The entertainment industry’s history
provides many examples of the difficulties involved in distinguishing
substitutes, unrelated products, and complements. Music companies
fought the introduction of radio in the 1920s, fearing the new medium
would provide close substitutes to buying records. Since that time, the
numerous attempts to bribe radio stations in the hopes of influencing
playlists suggest the industry has come to see radio as an important
complement to recordings (Coase 1979). Similarly, the entertainment
industry battled home taping and the introduction of the VCR, arguing
that the new technology “is to the American film producer and the
American public as the Boston strangler is to the woman home alone”
(Valenti 1982).
6 Once the Supreme Court decided to protect technolo-
gies like the VCR, it did not take the industry long to discover that sell-
ing videotapes (and now DVDs) presents a major business opportunity.
Similar uncertainty surrounds file‐sharing technology today. Some
argue that protected works and copies on file‐sharing networks are sub-
stitutes because consumers who would have bought the copyrighted
version now choose to download a free copy instead. Others see pro-
tected works and copies on file‐sharing networks as largely unrelated
because they believe that file sharers are mostly consumers who are not
willing to pay $10 for Taylor Swift’s latest release. Finally, protected
works and copies on file‐sharing networks are complements if consum-
ers rely on the new technology to discover CDs or DVDs they want to
purchase. These views need not be mutually exclusive. In a recent sur-
vey among file sharers, we found some support for all three conjectures
(Oberholzer‐Gee and Strumpf 2005); 65% of respondents acknowl-
edged they did not buy an album because they had downloaded it.
An even larger group (80%) claimed they bought at least one album
because they sampled it first on a file‐sharing network. Fortunately,
there is now a body of research that studies in a more systematic man-
ner whether copyright‐protected works and copies on file‐sharing net-
works are complements or substitutes. We will discuss this literature in
Section IV of this essay.
Even if a weakened copyright regime turned out to reduce industry
profitability, it is not obvious whether a decline in profits would under-
mine the incentives to create, market, and distribute artistic works. Two
considerations seem particularly important. First, as copyright weak-
ens, the effective price of music, movies, and books falls and consumer
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from these complements as well, the overall incentives to produce new
works might not decline. For instance, as music becomes effectively
available for free, the price of concerts, a complement to music, is likely
to rise, and artists who earn income from concerts might not be hurt by
a decline in music sales (Krueger 2005; Mortimer and Sorensen 2005).
Similarly, authors might be better able to supplement their income from
books through speaking tours, if many more readers are familiar with
their writings.
7
A second reason that a decline in industry profitability might not
hurt artistic production has to do with artist motivations. The remu-
neration of artistic talent differs from other types of labor in at least
two important respects. Artists often enjoy what they do, suggesting
that they might continue being creative even when the monetary incen-
tives to do so become weaker. In addition, artists receive a significant
portion of their remuneration not in monetary form—many of them
enjoy fame, admiration, social status, and free beer in bars—suggesting
that a reduction in monetary incentives might possibly have a reduced
impact on the quantity and quality of artistic production.
There is no doubt that file sharing substantially weakened the protec-
tion of copyrighted works. Yet, as our discussion shows, the outcome
of this experiment is far from certain. Three conditions need to hold for
less certain rights to undermine the incentives for artistic production:
original works and copies on file‐sharing networks must be reasonably
close substitutes, artists and the entertainment industry must not be
able to shift from previous sources of income to the (similarly profit-
able) sale of complements, and falling incomes must be an important‐
enough motivator for artists to reduce production. Only if all three
conditions hold will file sharing hurt social welfare.
It might seem curious to some of our readers that we do not consider
the welfare of artists and entertainment companies in our calculus. Our
approach, however, reflects the original intent of copyright protection,
which was conceived not as a welfare program for authors but to en-
courage the creation of new works. We know that stronger copyright
protection can increase the market value of companies.
8 But these gains
are a mechanism to raise social welfare, not the intended consequence.
9
III. A Brief History of File Sharing
To better understand the impact of file‐sharing technology on copyright
protection, it is useful to review the basics of file sharing. In this section,
File Sharing and Copyright 23we will also describe recent changes in technology and review the most
significant legal challenges that companies providing file‐sharing soft-
ware have faced to date.
File sharing relies on computers forming networks to allow the trans-
fer of data. Each computer (or node) may agree to share some files, and
file‐sharing software allows users to search for and download files from
other computers in the network. Individual nodes are called clients if
they request information, servers if they fulfill requests, and peers if
they do both.
S h a w nF a n n i n g ,a n1 8 ‐year‐o l ds t u d e n ta tB o s t o n ’s Northeastern
University, started the file‐sharing revolution when he released Napster
in June 1999 (table 1 provides a timeline). The software first allowed the
Table 1
Key Events in File Sharing
Date Event
Spring 1998 First mass‐produced MP3 player
October 1998 RIAA files restraining order against leading MP3 player
manufacturer
June 1999 Napster begins operations
December 1999 RIAA sues Napster for copyright damages
July 2000 U.S. District Court rules against Napster and in favor of RIAA.
Case moves to U.S. Court of Appeals, which affirms in
February 2001 that Napster is liable for damages
Spring–Summer 2001 Several alternative file‐sharing protocols are released,
including FastTrack/KaZaA, WinMX, LimeWire, and
BitTorrent
July 2001 Napster effectively shut down
November 2001 RIAA and MPAA sue file‐sharing software distributors
Morpheus and Grokster in MGM v. Grokster
Spring 2003 FastTrack/KaZaA peaks at about 4 million simultaneous users
September 2003 RIAA begins suing file‐sharing users; about 35,000 lawsuits
have been filed by the end of 2008
November 2003 The Pirate Bay, a BitTorrent index and tracker site, is founded
Fall 2004 A leading BitTorrent tracker and indexer has over 1 million
visits per day
June 2005 Supreme Court upholds the content holders position in
MGM v. Grokster; by the end of 2005, distribution companies
eDonkey and WinMX shut down after receiving cease‐and‐
desist letters from the RIAA
May 2006 In part due to pressure from the MPAA, Swedish police shut
down the Pirate Bay and confiscate its servers; site was
operational again in 3 days, and servers are now spread
over several countries
November 2008 25 million users on leading BitTorrent tracker, the Pirate Bay
Note: RIAA = Recording Industry Association of America; MPAA = Motion Picture
Association of America.
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used search engines, such as Lycos, and music Web sites to download
music. However, searching for files was cumbersome because the avail-
able music indexes were often out of date. Many sites offered more bro-
ken links than hits. Napster was novel in that it maintained a central
dynamic index of all available files. This index was updated every time
a user logged on or off. Thanks to its user‐friendly interface and seem-
ingly unlimited supply of music, the service gained 30 million users in
its first year.
Napster’s legal difficulties started not long after its initial release. In
December 1999, the RIAA sued Napster for contributory and vicarious
copyright infringement (A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004
[9th Cir. 2001]).
10 Two years and one appeal later, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals ruled against Napster, arguing that the service’s
central directory of files gave its makers knowledge of and the ability
to control user infringement. Unable to filter files from the network,
Napster shut down. However, putting Napster out of business proved
easier than ending file sharing. Most Napster users simply switched to
second‐generation peer‐to‐peer (P2P) services, and they were joined by
millions of file‐sharing novices. Three major networks eventually devel-
oped: eDonkey; FastTrack, a network used by KaZaA and Grokster;
and Gnutella, an open‐source network for clients such as Bearshare,
Gnucleus, LimeWire, and Morpheus.
The circuit court decision also proved influential for the further tech-
nological development of file‐sharing services. If P2P companies had
no direct knowledge of and control over infringing activities, many in
the industry believed, file‐sharing services might be protected by the
Supreme Court’s Betamax decision (Sony Corp. of America v. Universal
City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 [1984]). The decision holds that compa-
nies are not liable for customers’ acts of copyright infringement if their
technology is capable of substantial noninfringing uses. In the Sony
case, the Court estimated that about 9% of VCR recordings were of
TV shows that consumers had taped to watch at a later time and that
the producers of these shows did not object to time shifting. This was
sufficient to shield Sony from liability.
Convinced that P2P technology had substantial legal uses—for exam-
ple, the exchange of files that were in the public domain or the sharing
of documents within a company—second‐generation file‐sharing ser-
vices eliminated centralized indexes (Oberholzer‐Gee 2006). In these
systems, users first connect to a single peer using a specific Internet
protocol (IP). The peer then tells the software about other peers in
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and making it impossible for P2P companies to know whether users
trade copyrighted materials. At first, this strategy appeared to work.
When the RIAA sued the makers of Grokster, a branded version of
KaZaA, and Morpheus for contributory and vicarious copyright in-
fringement, District Court Judge Stephen V. Wilson ruled that the two
companies could not be held liable (MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.,
259 F. Supp. 2d 1029 [D. Cal. 2003]): “All Napster search traffic went
through, and relied upon, Napster. … [But] when users search for
and initiate transfers of files using the Grokster client, they do so with-
out any information being transmitted to or through any computers
owned or controlled by Grokster. … If either defendant closed their
doors and deactivated all computers within their control, users of their
products could continue sharing files with little or no interruption.”
The entertainment companies appealed the case, but the circuit court
upheld the earlier decision, affirming that decentralized P2P systems
met the standard set in Sony. On June 27, 2005, however, the Supreme
Court overturned the Ninth Circuit, sending the case back to the district
court for further consideration (MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545
U.S. 913 [2005]): “Because substantial evidence supports MGM on all
elements, summary judgment for the respondents was in error. On
remand, reconsideration of MGM’s summary judgment motion will
be in order.” The justices ruled that a company that distributed a device
“with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright” could be
liable for the resulting illegal acts. The Court argued that Grokster
and Morpheus had wanted to be the next Napster, showing that their
goal was to induce copyright infringement.
The Supreme Court’s decision led most P2P companies to settle with
the entertainment industry. An exception was LimeWire, a service that
continues to operate to this day. LimeWire argues that its software pro-
vides substantial legal uses. Forexample, the company operates a digital
music store that offers 500,000 songs, many of them from independent
bands. And LimeWire insists that it does not induce consumers to in-
fringe copyright. The RIAA filed a lawsuit against LimeWire in April
2006. At the time of this writing, no decision has been reached, leaving
open the question ofwhether services such as LimeWireare protected by
thestandardsetinSony.Atthesametime,severalsecond‐generationfile‐
sharing programs such as Ares Galaxy and eMule, the former eDonkey,
continue to be available as open‐source software.
While pursuing the developers of P2P software in the courts, the
RIAA also started suing P2P users who shared a large number of
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tion hoped its actions would help reverse the common view that file
sharing was a legitimate activity. In a Pew Internet and American Life
Project survey in 2000, 78% of Internet users who downloaded music
did not think they were stealing. A majority of the general Internet
population held the same view (Lenhart and Fox 2000). By the end of
2008, the industry had brought suits against more than 35,000 file
sharers. Most cases were settled, typically for a few thousand dollars.
In a surprising shift in legal tactics, however, the RIAA announced in
December 2008 that it had decided to drop its campaign against in-
dividual file sharers. Instead, the industry hoped to collaborate with
Internet service providers (ISPs) to stop the transfer of copyrighted ma-
terials. The trade group has worked out preliminary agreements with
major ISPs under which it will send an e‐mail to the provider when it
finds that customers share copyright‐protected files (McBride and
Smith 2008).
While the RIAA had some success putting P2P companies out of
business, file‐sharing technology continued to evolve. The most impor-
tant technical advance was the emergence of BitTorrent. BitTorrent file
requests differ from classic full‐file hypertext transfer protocol requests
in that the client makes many small data requests, similar to Internet
telephony, which breaks voices into small packets of data. In addition,
BitTorrent downloads follow a “rarest‐first” order, which ensures high
availability of files across the network. To start the downloading pro-
cess, users first obtain a torrent, a small file that contains metadata
about the file to be downloaded and information about the tracker,
the computer that coordinates the file distribution. Torrents are hosted
by a fairly small number of Web sites. The Pirate Bay is probably the
best known among them. The torrent allows the client to connect to the
tracker, from which it receives a list of peers that currently transfer
pieces of the file. As more peers connect to a tracker, they form a swarm
and begin to trade pieces with one another.
The advent of BitTorrent is significant for a number of reasons. First,
the improved technology significantly reduces download times. While
the user experience varies significantly, it has now become possible to
download a feature film in less than 2 hours. Second, the technology
forces users to share the parts of files that they already own while they
download the remaining bits. This procedure reduces the opportunity
to free ride that plagued older P2P systems. The protocol also rewards
users who contribute more generously, for instance, by allowing faster
downloads for those with greater upload capacity. Sharing digital files
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his copy. But more efficient file distribution systems such as BitTorrent
have now also succeeded in reducing the negative externalities that
users impose on one another when they transfer files.
A. Size of File‐Sharing Activity
Measuring the extent of file sharing is challenging (Karagiannis et al.
2003; Pasick 2004). Initial studies relied on surveys to determine the
number of users, but this approach is flawed because respondents are
likely to understate their participation in a potentially illegal activity.
What is more worrisome is that the level of understatement likely var-
ies over time based on the legal climate and peer effects among teens.
Surveys are also unreliable because it is difficult to survey a represen-
tative population of file sharers and because of recall issues.
Abetterapproachinvolvesidentifyingthepacketstraversingcomputer
networks. These studies use special hardware to classify messages that
are sent along networks by source, such as Web traffic, e‐mail, or file
sharing. This approach is taxing because of the scale of the activity (ISPs
typically handle many gigabits per second), the changes in the predomi-
nant file‐sharing protocol, and the recent move to encryption, which
makes packets unreadable to unauthorized observers. Measurement
studiesemploythreebasicapproachestodealwiththesetechnicalissues:
flow monitors, deep‐packet inspection, and direct interface with file‐
sharing users.
Flow monitoring analyzes unidirectional sequences of packets from
one IP address to another at the router level (Shalunov and Teitelbaum
2001). This approach inspects packets in a rather shallow way, relying
primarily on header information such as IP protocol and an exami-
nation of ports. Flow monitoring can analyze a large amount of traf-
fic, at the risk of misclassifying some of it. A detailed flow analysis of
Internet2, the U.S. high‐speed network that primarily connects univer-
sities, is available at the weekly level back to 2003 (Internet2 Netflow
Statistics 2009). Figure 1 shows that file‐sharing traffic on Internet2
has grown by roughly a factor of 10—from about 1 terabyte to about
10 terabytes—from 2003 through 2009.
11 While this growth has been
fairly steady, during 2003–5 there were large traffic dips during late
s p r i n ga n de a r l ys u m m e ra sw e l la ss m a l l e rd r o p sd u r i n gC h r i s t m a s .
These drops in file‐sharing activity reflect school vacations, periods
during which college students, who are among the highest file‐sharing
users, leave their high‐speed campus Internet connections.
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Rather than relying just on the packet header, this approach consid-
ers characteristics of the payload itself (Allot Communications 2007).
Packet inspection is the most accurate method of identifying file shar-
ing, but the technique requires extremely sophisticated equipment since
huge amounts of data must be analyzed. The deep‐packet inspection
company Sandvine has been monitoring file‐sharing trends for several
years. The company’s reports show that file sharing accounted for be-
tween 40% and 60% of all bandwidth usage over 2002–8 (Sandvine
2002–7, 2008a, 2008b). CacheLogic, another deep‐packet inspection
company, finds similar trends in global file activity (Ferguson 2006).
Figure 2 shows the growing role of file sharing over 1999–2006. By
2006, 60% of all consumer Internet traffic was due to file sharing, a
majority of which was composed of video files.
The final approach to measuring file sharing comes from studying
P2P networks directly. Observers use a modified version of file‐sharing
software to connect to a large number of users on the network. Direct
observation can provide fine‐grained information such as the identity
of files. A difficulty with this approach is that direct observers need
Fig. 1. Trends in U.S. file‐sharing activity, 2003–9. Bulk traffic is a transmission‐control
protocol flow that transferred more than 10 MB of data. No data are available for
the following weeks: 2/3/03, 7/28/03, 2/23/04, 12/20/04–5/2/05, 7/11/05, 2/27/06–
3/27/06, 4/17/06, 5/8/06–10/9/06, 2/19/07–3/5/07, 6/18/07, and 11/19/07.
Source: Internet2 Netflow Statistics (2009).
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leading practitioner is BigChampagne, a company that monitors indi-
vidual search requests as well as the content of folders that users share.
Figure 3 shows BigChampagne’s count of the monthly number of U.S.
file‐sharing users from mid‐2002 through mid‐2006.
12 By the end of this
period, there were about 7 million simultaneous users in the United
States. Unfortunately, more recent figures are not publicly available.
As with the earlier data on file‐sharing traffic, there is evidence of secu-
lar growth as well as reductions, or at least a lack of growth, during
summer months. The data also suggest one reason why the RIAA
has abandoned its approach of suing individual file sharers. In fig-
ure 3, it is difficult to ascertain an effect of the beginning of the 2003
lawsuit campaign (Manuse 2003). While the overall campaign may have
been disappointing from the RIAA’s perspective, research has docu-
mented a short‐run decline in the number of files shared and in down-
loading activity in response to the first round of lawsuits (Bhattacharjee
et al. 2007). In contrast, the Grokster SupremeCourt decision in 2005 does
not appear to have had much impact on the user base.
13
The data from these disparate sources paint a similar picture for
trends in U.S. file sharing. There has been secular growth in both the
Fig. 2. Global file sharing, 1999–2006; FTP = file transfer protocol; P2P = peer to peer.
Source: Ferguson (2006).
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largely been unaffected by shifts in technology and the legal environ-
ment. At the same time, figure 1 shows that the intrayear cycle in file
sharing observed in the early years has started to disappear. As broad-
band has proliferated outside of universities and to the home, young
file‐sharing users no longer rely on their university connections during
the school year to download files.
B. Consumer Behavior
Three facts about consumer behavior on file‐sharing networks strike us
as particularly interesting: the narrow focus on a limited set of files, the
truly global nature of file sharing, a n dt h ec o n t i n u e di m p o r t a n c eo f
industry marketing efforts. We discuss each of these in turn.
Users share a wide variety of files on P2P networks. Table 2 shows
the distribution of a selected list of genres on a popular P2P network
and compares it to store sales of these albums and downloads of
songs (for a detailed description of the sample, see Oberholzer‐Gee
and Strumpf [2007]). Genres such as R&B, rap, and new artists are over-
represented, while there is comparatively little country music. Looking
at what users actually download, it is striking to see how dominant the
current alternative category is. Almost one‐half of all downloads are
transfers of songs in this genre. The data in table 2 reflect the supply
of music files in 2002, the stone age of file sharing. We do not know
of any study that has systematically compared changes in content over
time.
While the supply of files is vast, P2P users download only a small
share of the files that are available. In our sample of 10,271 different
Fig. 3. Trends in the number of U.S. file‐sharing users; P2P = peer to peer. Source:
http://www.bigchampagne.com.
File Sharing and Copyright 31music tracks, 60% are never downloaded over a period of 17 weeks, and
81% are downloaded less than five times, a number that is just slightly
above the mean.
14 Even in movies, for which the number of available
titles is far smaller, there is a notable focus on the most popular titles.
Table3showstheavailabilityofandthedemandformoviesonMininova,
a popularBitTorrent index site.Not surprisingly, the topDVD rentals are
all in high demand.Butdemand trailsoffmarkedlyforoldertitles, many
of which are not even available. A case in point is Malin Akerman, a
Swedish actress voted numberone on the Internet Movie Database’s star
meter in early 2009. Akerman was one of the stars of the then popular
movie Watchmen. As the last column in table 3 shows, there was in fact
significant demand for that release. But movie buffs with an interest in
Table 2
Files on File‐Sharing Networks (%)
Songs on Network Store Sales Downloads
Full sample 100.0 100.0 100.0
Catalog 8.0 9.8 12.6
Current alternative 19.1 24.8 48.6
Hard music top overall 3.0 5.9 5.3
Jazz current 2.9 4.6 .4
Latin 3.5 5.8 .7
New artists 8.0 3.3 1.8
R&B 25.2 9.7 14.9
Rap 13.7 8.2 4.6
Top current country 10.2 18.4 7.3
Top sound track 6.4 9.4 3.9
Source: Oberholzer‐Gee and Strumpf (2007).
Table 3






1 Role Models (2008) 10,482 Watchmen 53,476
2 Transporter 3 (2008) 11,225 Bye Bye Sally NA
3 Australia (2008) 17,244 27 Dresses 367
4 Milk (2008) 2,833 Heavy Petting 0
5 Beverly Hills Chihuahua (2008) 3,050 The Heartbreak Kid 53
6 Rachel Getting Married (2008) 1,705 The Brothers Solomon 0
7 Body of Lies (2008) 10,394 The Invasion NA
8 In the Electric Mist (2009) 1,885 Harold and Kumar 382
9 Changeling (2008) 11,149 The Utopian Society NA
10 Nights in Rodanthe (2008) 1,290 The Circle NA
Sources: Internet Movie Database (http://www.imdb.com/) and Mininova (http://
www.mininova.org/), accessed March 14, 2009.
Oberholzer‐Gee and Strumpf 32Akerman’s previous films faced rather slim pickings. At the height of
the popularity of Akerman, four of her last 10 movies were unavailable,
and there was no demand for two additional films.
15 As in music, down-
loading activity for movies is heavily concentrated on current releases,
and the supply of titles is substantially broader than the demand.
Asecondinteresting factabout consumer behavioronP2P networks is
the truly global nature of file sharing. Table 4 shows the top countries for
users and downloads (from Oberholzer‐Gee and Strumpf 2007). Interac-
tions among file sharers transcend geography and language. The U.S.
users download only 45.1% of their files from other U.S. users, with
the remainder coming from a diverse range of countries including Ger-
many (16.5%), Canada (6.9%), and Italy (6.1%). One implication of these
interactions is that national regulations of file sharing will only have
limited bite. For instance, if the RIAA and domestic ISPs discouraged
U.S.usersfrommakingfilesavailable,astheycurrentlyhopetodo,users
in the United States could simply download files from other countries.
A final observation concerns the marketing efforts of the entertain-
ment industry. In view of the vast supply of music and videos on the
Table 4
























States 30.9 35.7 45.1 49.0 4.6 27.4
Germany 13.5 14.1 16.5 8.9 1.3 5.3
Italy 11.1 9.9 6.1 5.7 .9 3.2
Japan 8.4 2.8 2.5 1.8 2.0 9.3
France 6.9 6.9 3.8 4.7 1.0 2.8
Canada 5.4 6.1 6.9 7.9 .5 2.8
United
Kingdom 4.1 4.0 4.2 4.2 1.0 5.7
Spain 2.5 2.6 1.8 2.0 .6 1.3
Netherlands 2.1 2.1 1.9 1.6 .3 1.6
Australia 1.6 1.9 .8 2.2 .3 1.8
Sweden 1.5 1.7 1.8 1.5 .1 1.0
Switzerland 1.4 1.5 .9 1.0 .1 .6
Brazil 1.3 1.4 1.2 1.3 2.9 2.3
Belgium .9 1.2 .5 1.0 .2 .6
Austria .8 .6 .6 .4 .1 .6
Poland .5 .7 .7 .5 .6 1.1
Source: Oberholzer‐Gee and Strumpf (2007).
File Sharing and Copyright 33Internet and the many electronic networks connecting individuals, it
might seem reasonable to expect that the industry’s ability to draw at-
tention to particular products has been greatly diminished. But the data
in figure 4 tell a different story. The graph shows downloads and sales
of the popular Eight Mile sound track, a commercial success directed by
Curtis Hanson, starring rapper Eminem. Note that the recording leaked
about 6 weeks before the official album release, with Eight Mile songs
becoming available on P2P networks. But, interestingly, the level of
downloads remained small until the industry marketing campaign
began. Unless the industry drums up support for a new release, it is
apparently difficult to give it away for free. This pattern of downloads
and sales is fairly typical in our data. Contrary to the view that the
entertainment industry has lost its ability to create value in a networked
world, these data suggest that the recording industry remains un-
rivaled in its ability to steer consumer attention.
IV. Does File Sharing Reduce the Sale of Copyrighted Materials?
The sharing of information goods such as music, movies, and books has
been the subject of a substantial literature, both theoretical and empiri-
cal. Theory has most often focused on two competing intuitions about
Fig. 4. Industry marketing and file‐sharing data from Oberholzer‐Gee and Strumpf
(2007).
Oberholzer‐Gee and Strumpf 34the effects of file sharing. A first is obvious: copying hurts producers
because consumers who would have purchased a product now obtain
it for free. But there is a second effect that runs counter to this idea.
Because consumers anticipate sharing products, their willingness to
pay (and hence producer profits) might actually increase. For example,
a family might be willing to buy an expensive video game because the
parents know that several children will enjoy playing it. The theoretical
literature has successfully identified a number of factors that influence
the balance of these two effects, including the relative cost of producing
information goods and sharing, the variation in the size of groups that
share protected works, as well as the diversity in consumer valuations
and the correlation of valuations within a sharing group (Novos and
Waldman 1984; Johnson 1985; Liebowitz 1985; Besen and Kirby 1989;
Bakos, Brynjolfsson, and Lichtman 1999; Varian 2000). Depending on
the importance of the relevant parameters, theoretical modeling pre-
dicts that file sharing can either hurt or help producers (for a review
of theory papers, see Peitz and Waelbroeck [2003]).
Because the theoretical results are inconclusive, the effect of file
sharing on industry profitability is largely an empirical question. We
summarize the findings of some of the major studies in table 5. As the
list shows, the results are decidedly mixed. There are two studies that
document a positive effect of file sharing on sales: Andersen and Frenz
(2008), for a representative sample of Canadian consumers, and, more
narrowly, Gopal and Bhattacharjee (2006), for the effect of sampling
on CD sales.
16 The majority of studies find that file sharing reduces
sales, with estimated displacement rates ranging from 3.5% for movies
(Rob and Waldfogel 2007) to rates as high as 30% for music (Zentner
2006).
17 A typical estimate is a displacement rate of about 20%. One
implication of these results is that developments other than file shar-
ing must have had a profound impact on sales. For music, the pop-
u l a r i t yo fn e wt y p e so f( I n t e r n e t ‐based) entertainment and the end
of the transition from LPs to CDs are leading explanations for the
overall decline in sales (Hong 2004; Oberholzer‐Gee and Strumpf
2007). While many studies find some displacement, an important
group of papers reports that file sharing does not hurt sales at all
(Tanaka 2004; Bhattacharjee et al. 2007; Oberholzer‐Gee and Strumpf
2007; Smith and Telang 2008). And even among the studies that show
some displacement, there tend to be important subsamples that were
not affected. For example, Rob and Waldfogel (2006) find an average
displacement effect of 20% but report that file sharing had no impact
on hit albums. In order to better understand why file‐sharing studies





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































dcome to varying conclusions, it is instructive to consider a number of
challenges in the empirical literature.
Choice of sample.—Researchers frequently rely on convenience sam-
ples, typically students, to estimate the effect of file sharing on sales.
This is problematic because surveys show high school and college stu-
d e n t st ob ea m o n gt h em o s ta c t i v ef i l es h a r e r s( P e wI n t e r n e tP r o j e c t
2003). As a result, the displacement rates documented in these studies
are likely to lie above the true population rates. Convenience aside, we
suspect that many scholars rely on unrepresentative samples of stu-
dents because it used to be almost impossible, and remains often expen-
sive, to gain access to representative sales data. For instance, U.S. sales
data for music, traditionally shared among record companies, have
only become available to researchers in the most recent years. And even
today, short‐term subscriptions to industry databases can cost thou-
sands of dollars, excluding scholars with more limited research bud-
gets.
18 To arrive at a more complete understanding of file sharing,
increased collaboration between industry and academia—and the
employment of representative samples—appears essential to us.
Measures of piracy.—A key difficulty in interpreting the findings of
m a n ys t u d i e si st h a tt h e yr e l yo ns e l f ‐reported data or poor proxies
for actual file sharing. As table 5 indicates, surveys with self‐reported
measures of piracy play a significant role in the literature. Unfortu-
nately, we do not know much about the accuracy of survey data in
the context of file sharing. As Zentner (2006) points out, some indi-
viduals might play down their file sharing because they understand
it is illegal. However, if file sharing is hip, as is the case on many college
campuses, students might exaggerate the activity. In Andersen and
Frenz (2008), more than 10% of respondents who report having down-
loaded music do not provide the number of downloaded files, suggest-
ing recall or perhaps response bias might also be an issue. In view of the
popularity of survey‐based measures of piracy, we consider it impor-
tant for future researchers to establish their accuracy. If these data turn
out to be reliable, they could play a major role in future research be-
cause survey data are simple and inexpensive to obtain.
Where survey data on piracy are unavailable, researchers tend to rely
on crude proxies for file sharing such as Internet penetration. In a num-
ber of studies, Internet‐related measures (penetration, user sophistica-
tion) also serve as an instrument for downloading. In our view, both
usages are inappropriate. Internet penetration proxies for new forms
of entertainment—think YouTube and World of Warcraft—that com-
pete directly with music and traditional film consumption, yielding a
File Sharing and Copyright 41negative bias in displacement studies. Given these fairly obvious short-
comings, why are there so few papers that use actual data on file
sharing to measure its effect on sales? One reason, we believe, is that
collecting data on file‐sharing networks is labor intensive and often
cumbersome. Sometimes it is necessary to gain the trust of individuals
operating file‐sharing servers. And automated measurement studies
require considerable programming skills and knowledge of file‐sharing
software. These hurdles notwithstanding, it is disappointing to see how
few social scientists have made the effort to collect data on actual be-
havior. Many scholars prefer to use widely available, but in our view
inappropriate, proxies for file sharing. The resulting research is poorer
for it. The situation in the social sciences is in marked contrast to the
research in computer science in which many studies carefully measure
individual file‐sharing activity (e.g., Leibowitz et al. 2002; Gummadi
et al. 2003; Liang, Kumar, and Ross 2005; Liang, Kumar, Xi, and Ross
2005; Pouwelse et al. 2005; Dhungel et al. 2008).
We emphasize these issues because the results in table 5 seem to sug-
gest that measurement choices have a systematic impact on results.
While the majority of papers report some sales displacement, the four
studies using actual measures offile sharing (Tanaka 2004;Bhattacharjee
et al. 2007; Oberholzer‐Gee and Strumpf 2007; Smith and Telang 2008)
find that file sharing is unrelated to changes in sales.
Unobserved heterogeneity.—A common difficulty in studying the link
between downloads and sales is that file sharing is endogenous. That is,
there are factors, some of them unobserved by the econometrician, that
influence both downloads and sales. For example, music lovers are
likely to download more songs, and they also buy a larger number of
albums, making it look like there was a positive relation between file
sharing and sales. To see this, consider figure 5, taken from Oberholzer‐
Gee and Strumpf (2005). In this graph, downloads (horizontal axis) ap-
pear to increase sales (verticalaxis).But analternativeexplanation isthat
the popularity of a release increases both file‐sharing activity and sales:
popular recordings are in high demand on the Internet and in the store.
Difference‐in‐difference (DD) estimates and instrumental variable
techniques are popular means by which scholars hope to break the link
between unobserved factors and the estimated impact of piracy on
sales. DD models yield unbiased estimates if the unobserved heteroge-
neity is time invariant. Unfortunately, time‐varying unobserved factors
appear to play a major role in file sharing. Comparing DD estimates
with results that take into account how cohort characteristics change
over time, Hong (2008) finds that DD estimates attribute the entire
Oberholzer‐Gee and Strumpf 422002 decline in record sales to Napster. Once changes in unobserved
heterogeneity are taken into account, the sales displacement rate drops
from 100% to 20%. Similarly, Oberholzer‐Gee and Strumpf (2007) show
that the combination of album and week fixed effects is insufficient to
control for unobserved heterogeneity.
Instrumental variable techniques provide a potentially more promis-
ing way to identify the effect of file sharing on sales. As noted above,
we are skeptical of attempts to use measures of broadband adoption or
user Internet sophistication as instruments. More promising identifica-
tion strategies exploit technical aspects of file‐sharing systems—the
availability of BitTorrent indexing sites, for instance, fluctuates consid-
erably over time for largely technical reasons—and shocks to the global
supply of content. For example, Oberholzer‐Gee and Strumpf (2007)
exploit the fact that many files downloaded in the United States come
fromGermany.DuringGermanschoolholidays,filesharing inthe United
States becomes easier: download times are shorter, a greater fraction of
searches lead to a successful download, and fewer download requests
remainincomplete.BecauseGermanholidaysareunrelatedtoU.S.music
sales, the holiday shock makes a promising instrument. More generally,
becausefilesharingisatrulyglobalphenomenon,therearemanyshocks
that spread from country to country. Some of these will be unrelated to
the domestic demand for entertainment, making them promising pros-
pects in the quest for proper identification.
Fig. 5. Endogeneity of file sharing data from Oberholzer‐Gee and Strumpf (2005)
File Sharing and Copyright 43V. How Important Are Complementary Sources of Income?
Eveniffilesharingdisplacessales,theweakercopyrightregimeneednot
undermine the incentives to produce new works if artists and entertain-
ment companies can shift their earnings from selling music, games, and
moviestosellingcomplementstotheseproducts.Aninterestingexample
is concerts. As table 6 shows, concerts and merchandising have become
Table 6
Artist Incomes (US$millions)
Rank Artist Concerts Recordings Publishing Total
1 Paul McCartney 64.9 2.2 2.2 72.1
2 The Rolling Stones 39.6 .9 2.2 44.0
3 Dave Matthews Band 27.9 .0 2.5 31.3
4 Celine Dion 22.4 3.1 .9 31.1
5 Eminem 5.5 10.4 3.8 28.9
6 Cher 26.2 .5 .0 26.7
7 Bruce Springsteen 17.9 2.2 4.5 24.8
8 Jay‐Z .7 12.7 .7 22.7
9 Ozzy Osbourne 3.8 .2 .5 22.5
10 Elton John 20.2 .9 1.3 22.4
11 The Eagles 15.1 .7 1.4 17.6
12 Jimmy Buffet 13.7 .2 .5 17.6
13 Billy Joel 16.0 .0 1.0 17.0
14 Neil Diamond 16.5 .0 .3 16.8
15 Aerosmith 11.6 1.0 .8 16.5
16 CSNY 15.7 .0 .3 16.0
17 Creed 10.9 1.1 1.6 13.4
18 Rush 13.4 .0 .0 13.4
19 Linkin Park 1.7 4.7 6.3 13.1
20 The Who 12.6 .0 .0 12.6
21 Red Hot Chili Peppers 6.1 3.4 2.7 12.1
22 Brian “Baby” Williams .2 2.7 .9 11.8
23 N Sync 7.7 .5 .9 9.4
24 Barry Manilow 8.0 1.2 .0 9.2
25 Britney Spears 5.5 1.8 1.0 9.1
26 Alan Jackson 4.6 3.0 1.4 9.0
27 Rod Stewart 6.6 1.4 .8 8.8
28 Andrea Bocelli 8.1 .2 .4 8.7
29 Brooks and Dunn 6.7 .4 1.4 8.1
30 Enrique Iglesias 4.4 1.5 1.7 7.6
31 Tom Petty 6.6 .2 .7 7.5
32 Tool 7.3 .0 .0 7.4
33 Kid Rock 3.4 .8 1.3 7.0
34 Kenny Chesney 5.8 1.1 .1 7.0
35 Santana 6.0 .0 .7 6.9
Average 12.7 1.7 1.3 17.4
Source: Connolly and Krueger (2006).
Note: Figures are estimates of pretax gross income in 2002.
Oberholzer‐Gee and Strumpf 44an important source of income for major artists (Connolly and Krueger
2006). Concerts and new recordings are complements. A recording be-
comes more enjoyable if one can reminisce about the time at the concert,
and knowing the songs in advance might make the concert more enjoy-
able. In the presence of complementary goods, file sharing will have two
opposing effects (for aformal model, see Mortimer and Sorensen [2005]).
As the effective price of music falls close to zero, a larger number of
consumers will be familiar with an album, driving up the demand for
concerts. At the same time, artists have weaker incentives to tour be-
cause concerts are a less effective way to increase revenues from a new
recording if a large fraction of the audience shares files. Which of these
effects is more important? Figure 6 shows that concert prices rose much
more quickly than the consumer price index, and the difference appears
to have widened since the advent of file sharing (Krueger 2005). More
detailed evidence on the link between file sharing and concerts comes
fromMortimerandSorensen(2005).Studying2,135artistsovera10‐year
period, they also conclude that the demand for concerts increased due to
file sharing. One way to see this is to ask how many CDs an artist needs
to sell to produce $20 of concert revenue. This number fell from 8.47 in
the pre‐Napster era to 6.36 in 1999–2002. Not surprisingly, artists re-
spondedtotheseincentivesbytouringmorefrequently.Overall,theshift
Fig. 6. Concert prices, 1981–2004; CPI = consumer price index. Source: Krueger (2005)
File Sharing and Copyright 45in relative prices and activities led to a sharp increase in income for the
typical artist included in the authors’ data set.
As these results show, income from the sale of complements can more
than compensate artists for any harm that file sharing might do to their
primary activity. We are not aware of empirical work that has looked
at these effects in industries other than music. But the potential of com-
plements to provide ancillary income is certainly not unique to the
music industry. In film, for instance, the International Licensing In-
dustry Merchandisers’ Association estimates that Hollywood derives
$16 billion annually from sales of entertainment merchandise, a figure
that exceeds the value of ticket sales (Film Encyclopedia 2008).
The role of complements makes it necessary to adopt a broad view of
markets when considering the impact of file sharing on the creative in-
dustries. Unfortunately, the popular press—and a good number of pol-
icy experts—often evaluate file sharing by looking at a single product
market. Analyzing trends in CD sales, for example, they conclude that
piracy has wrecked havoc on the music business. This view confuses
value creation and value capture. Record companies may find it more
difficult to profitably sell CDs, but the broader industry is in a far better
position. In fact, it is easy to make an argument that the business has
grown considerably. Figure 7 shows spending on CDs, concerts, and
iPods. The decline in music sales—they fell by 15% from 1997 to 2007—
is the focus of much discussion. However, adding in concerts alone
shows that the industry has grown by 5% over this period. If we also
consider the sale of iPods as a revenue stream, the industry is now 66%
larger than in 1997. Obviously, these numbers are no more than a rough
back‐of‐the‐envelope calculation. A more serious investigation would
take into account differences in profitability across music and concert
sales as well as the decreased spending in other electronics categories
(CD players, speakers, etc.). The point of the graph, however, remains:
technological change will often lead to changes in relative prices and
shifts in business opportunities. Focusing exclusively on traditional
streams of revenue to arrive at a sense of how new technology changes
welfare will typically be misleading.
VI. Does File Sharing Undermine Artistic Production?
In any evaluation of file sharing, a key question is whether financial
incentives are needed to encourage artistic output.
19 W h i l et h i si si n
large part an open question, several indirect pieces of evidence suggest
that financial incentives play a smaller role in the creative industries
Oberholzer‐Gee and Strumpf 46than elsewhere in the economy.
20 For concreteness we will focus our
discussion on popular music, but many ideas discussed here carry over
to film, visual arts, writing, and high‐culture music (see Caves 2000).
The economic prospects for the group of popular musicians as a
whole are quite poor. An album selling a half million copies or more
(a gold album) is considered successful. Typically, a few hundred al-
bums reach this level each year. Yet over 50,000 albums are released
annually, suggesting the chance of success is less than one in a hun-
dred. Perhaps more strikingly, only 950 new albums sold more than
25,000 copies in 2007.
Moreover, it is difficult for musicians to earn substantial income from
recorded music sales, regardless of the success of their album. This is
in part due to the nature of recorded music contracts (Passman 2000).
Recording musicians are paid for album sales, based on the product of
a royalty rate and album sales. The royalty rate is quite low (usually
about a dollar or two per album), and musicians are not paid this money
until they recoup all expenses, primarily the advance that is typically
applied to the cost of recording the album. If an earlier album did not
sell well enough to pay for the advance, music companies often de-
duct the difference from future album payments under a system called
Fig. 7. U.S. music industry sales trends. Sources: Recording Industry Association of
America “2007 Year‐End Shipment Statistics” (http://www.riaa.com), Pollstar (http://
www.pollstar.com), and Apple Inc. annual reports (http://www.apple.com), accessed
March 18, 2008.
File Sharing and Copyright 47cross‐collateralization. Putting all this together, even a gold album may
not provide a musician with an economic windfall.
21
Given these poor prospects, why are there so many musicians? One
explanation is that musicians enjoy their profession. Under this view,
musicians take pleasure from creating and performing music, as well
as aspects of the lifestyle such as flexible hours and the lack of an
immediate boss. If this theory is correct, the economic impact of file
sharing is not likely to have a major impact on music creation.
An alternative explanation is that popular music is a tournament, in
which a few artists collect most of the economic rewards. This view is
rooted in the theory of superstars (Rosen 1981). Superstars develop in
industries with low marginal cost of production, little relation between
output and quality, and quality‐conscious consumers. This seems to be
a reasonable model of popular music: it is relatively cheap to produce
CDs and even cheaper to make digital albums. Each album produced
provides the same quality level, and most consumers would rather lis-
ten to one very good album than a few albums of lesser quality. Under
the superstar theory, musicians essentially consider their job to be a lot-
tery, with some small chance that they will become a star. In 2007, the
top 1% of new releases accounted for 82% of new‐release sales. In a
superstar environment, file sharing has a muted effect on music output.
Even if the new technology had a marked negative effect on the returns
to stardom, it is not likely to have a big effect on the chances of becom-
ing a star.
22
Survey evidence (as well as the long lines of contestants hoping to be
part of talent shows like American Idol) support these theoretical argu-
ments. In a Pew study of 2,755 musicians and songwriters (Madden
2004), over three‐fourths of respondents reported having a paying non-
music job.
23 These second jobs are the primary source of income for
most musicians. Only 16% reported that at least 60% of their income
derived from their music job, while 66% said they earned less than
20% of their income from music. The small income share is not simply
due to spending few hours on music. Even among those who spent at
least 30 hours a week on music‐related activities, only 22% derived at
least four‐fifths of their income from music.
Overall production figures for the creative industries appear to be
consistent with this view that file sharing has not discouraged artists
and publishers. While album sales have generally fallen since 2000, the
number of albums being created has exploded. In 2000, 35,516 albums
were released. Seven years later, 79,695 albums (including 25,159 digital
albums) were published (Nielsen SoundScan 2008). Even if file sharing
Oberholzer‐Gee and Strumpf 48were the reason that sales have fallen, the new technology does not
appear to have exacted a toll on the quantity of music produced.
24
Obviously, it would be nice to adjust output for differences in quality,
but we are not aware of any research that has tackled this question.
Similar trends can be seen in other creative industries. For example,
the worldwide number of feature films produced each year increased
from 3,807 in 2003 to 4,989 in 2007 (Screen Digest 2009). Countries in
which film piracy is rampant have typically increased production. This
is true in South Korea (80–124), India (877–1,164), and China (140–402).
During this period, U.S. feature film production increased from 459 fea-
ture films in 2003 to 590 in 2007 (MPAA 2007).
VII. Policy Implications and Conclusions
File‐sharing technology considerably weakened copyright protection,
first of music and software and increasingly of movies, games, and
books. The policy discussion surrounding file sharing has largely
focused on the legality of the new technology and the question of
whether declining sales in music are due to file sharing. While these
are important questions, in our view, the debate has been overly nar-
row. Copyright exists to encourage innovation and the creation of new
works, in other words, to promote social welfare. The question to ask is,
thus, whether the new technology has undermined the incentives to
create, market, and distribute entertainment. Sales displacement is a
necessary but not a sufficient condition for harm to occur. We also need
to know whether income from complementary products offset the de-
clineinincomefromcopyrightedworks.Andevenifincomefell,welfare
may not suffer if artists do not respond to weaker monetary incentives.
As our survey indicates, the empirical evidence on sales displace-
ment is mixed. While some studies find evidence of a substitution ef-
fect, other findings, in particular the papers using actual file‐sharing
data, suggest that piracy and music sales are largely unrelated. In con-
trast, there is clear evidence that income from complements has risen in
recent years. For example, concert sales have increased more than music
sales have fallen. Similarly, a fraction of consumer electronics purchases
and Internet‐related expenditures are due to file sharing. Unfortunately,
we know little about the distribution of these impacts. How markets for
complementary goods have responded to file sharing remains an area
of inquiry that is largely unexplored in academic research.
The same holds true for the question of how artists would respond to
weaker monetary incentives. Looking at aggregate output—the number
File Sharing and Copyright 49of recordings, books, and movies produced every year—we see no evi-
dence that file sharing has discouraged the production of artistic works.
However, as with income from complementary goods, aggregate statis-
tics need to be interpreted with some care. For example, digital formats
not only encouraged file sharing; digital technology also lowered the
cost of producing movies and music, and it allowed artists to reach
their audience in novel ways. The observed increase in output is in part
d u et ot h e s ec h a n g e s .T h er e s p o n s eo fa r t i s t st ot e c h n o l o g y ‐induced
changes in income is a second area that we would like to single out
as important for future research.
As this essay has made clear, we do not yet have a full understanding
of the mechanisms by which file sharing may have altered the in-
centives to produce entertainment. However, in the industry with the
largest purported impact—music—consumer access to recordings has
vastly improved since the advent of file sharing. Since 2000, the number
of recordings produced has more than doubled. In our view, this makes
it difficult to argue that weaker copyright protection has had a negative
impact on artists’ incentives to be creative.
Endnotes
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Washington, DC, for helpful comments.
1. Copyright refers to a complex bundle of rights that includes the rights of
authors (composers, lyricists) and publishers (for a detailed description of these
contracts, see Towse 1999; Passman 2000). Throughout this essay, we use the
term somewhat loosely, referring to all legal protections—including, e.g., the
“neighboring rights” of performers—that encourage the creation, production,
marketing, and distribution of works. Also, we neglect the tensions that exist
in copyright between artist and publisher interests (see Towse 1999; Gayer and
Shy 2006).
2. In the United States, as elsewhere, the degree of protection has steadily
expanded, from the modest Copyright Act of 1790, which offered 14 years of
protection with a renewal period of 14 years, to the legislation passed in 1831
(28 years), 1909 (renewal extended to 28 years), 1976 (50 years after the author’s
death), 1992 (automatic renewal), and 1998 (70 years).
3. A classic example is butter and margarine.
4. A mash‐up is a song created out of pieces of two or more songs, usually by
laying the vocal track of one song over the music track of another.
5. Leung (2008) estimates that piracy contributes 20% to iPod sales.
6. Stanley M. Gortikov (1982), president of the Recording Industry Associa-
tion of America (RIAA), explained in hearings before a House committee on
April 14, 1982: “I’m scared, and so is my industry. Changing technology today
is threatening to destroy the value of our copyrights and the vitality of the
music industry. Our nemesis is home taping.”
Oberholzer‐Gee and Strumpf 507. Author Cory Doctorow, e.g., says, “I really feel like my problem isn’t
piracy. It’s obscurity” (Rich 2009, 311).
8. Baker and Cunningham (2006), e.g., estimate that a statute broadening
copyright adds up to $39 million to the market capitalization of a typical firm.
9. To frame our discussion in terms of efficiency (Pareto improvements), we
argue that the relevant benchmark is the welfare of groups in a situation with-
out copyright.
10. A party is liable for contributory infringement if it knows of the infringing
activity and materially contributes to it. Vicarious infringement occurs when
the indirect infringer benefits financially from the infringement.
11. Karagiannis et al. (2004) employ a similar methodology in studying Tier 1
ISP traffic. They conclude that file sharing did not decline over 2003–4.
12. User counts from the independent file‐sharing site slyck.com largely
mirror these numbers.
13. Similarly, Ferguson (2006) shows that eDonkey traffic levels were largely
unaffected in 2006 when legal authorities forced the closure of a large network
of servers.
14. Our sample is drawn from SoundScan charts, which include all commer-
cially relevant albums. Although some of the albums in the sample had low
sales, many in fact were very high sellers.
15. The concentration of movie downloads, in part, reflects the current
BitTorrent technology. Index sites, which list the files available for download,
typically delist a title when no one is sharing a complete copy for some length
of time. As a result, less popular movies become often unavailable, as do older
movies since the number of shared copies tends to decline over time.
16. Gopal and Bhattacharjee (2006) results are consistent with the theoretical
findings in Peitz and Waelbroeck (2006).
17. An outlier is Liebowitz (2008), who reports a displacement rate of more
than 100% for a selection of U.S. music markets.
18. Nielsen SoundScan, the dominant provider of record sales, offers an
academic subscription for $10,000 a year. Nielsen VideoScan is even more
expensive. Box office numbers for theatrical releases are freely available from
Box Office Mojo, but learning about geographic variation in sales is more diffi-
cult. Fortunately, Nielsen BookScan data are available at a reasonable cost.
19. In this respect, the arts are similar to the production of open‐source soft-
ware, for which many programmers appear to work for little monetary gain
(Lerner and Tirole 2005).
20. The broader critique of Boldrin and Levine (2008) implies that for innova-
tion to take place more generally, copyright and patents are not needed.
21. For specific dollar totals from insiders in the music industry, see Albini
(1994) and Love (2000).
22. Consider a model in which individuals must choose between being a mu-
sician and some outside reservation job. If p is the probability of being a star,
s the income (and nonpecuniary benefits) of being a star, n the income of a non-
star, and r the income from the reservation jobs, then the person decides to be a
musician when pUðsÞþð 1   pÞUðnÞ UðrÞ, where Uð Þ is a utility function and
s ≫ r > n. Even if file sharing has a large negative effect on s,t h i sw i l lo n l y
have a limited impact on the left‐hand side, presuming s remains large and
U′ < 0.
23. The musicians surveyed come from a wide range of music genres, includ-
ing pop, folk, country, electronic, blues, rock, jazz, Christian, punk, dance, blue-
grass, Latin, reggae, and hip-hop. This wide coverage suggests that the
responses should incorporate a range of viewpoints.
File Sharing and Copyright 5124. Similarly, recording contracts seem to remain appealing. In 2009, 1,900
acts performed at South‐by‐Southwest, a large music festival that attracts mu-
sicians looking to sign their first recording contract. The artists must typically
pay their own travel and lodging expenses, in addition to any forgone wages
from their secondary job. Clearly a large number of musicians thought attend-
ing the festival was a worthwhile investment (Pareles 2009).
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